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Labor Participation: 
A Way to Industrial Democracy 
Solomon Barkin 
The author examines the rôle and forms of industrial 
democracy in the enterprise and when in the process of 
sélection of questions, study and analysis, search for solu-
tions and defining the final décision and which methods of 
implementation shall employées and their union share, and 
in what manner, the responsibilities of decision-making with 
management. Current arrangements must be viewed essen-
tially as transitional accommodations in the unending search 
for viable, more satisfying and productive plans. 
Political democracy in the Western World swept away the théories 
of the «divine rights of kings.» Représentative government followed. 
Then the restrictions on suffrage instituted in the early years of the 
new démocratie era gave way before the demands for universal 
suffrage made by the Libéral and the Socialist parties supported by the 
great mass of people who had accepted the philosophies and slogans 
of the political révolutions. The goal was reached in the 1920's and 
extended to the late teenagers in the seventies. 
Its counterpart, industrial democracy, became an active goal for 
diverse reformers, libérais and anti-capitalist groups, as well as the 
advocates of unionism. As workers grew in number, absorbing Chris-
tian and Socialist doctrines, the real confrontation began on the issue. 
By that time property-owners and corporations had had their rights 
sanctioned in practice and law. The decision-making process in the 
enterprise became the target of the advocates of industrial democracy 
seeking to gain for employées suprême rights or at least those equal 
to management. 
But this challenge has been stoutly resisted. Owners and managers 
disputed and fought the counterclaimants. They defended and enhanced 
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their positions and sphères of sovereignty and would yield as little 
as possible of the power to control and direct. 
Concurrently they endeavored to capitalize for managements' ends 
on employées' self-consciousness and yearnings for improved jobs and 
working conditions, better earnings and participation in local decision-
making. 
Both management and labor projected over time newer devices, 
formulas, and théories better to advance or défend their positions. 
The debate and proposais gyrated explicitly or implicitly about the same 
area of contention: the rôle and forms of industrial democracy in the 
enterprise and when in the process of sélection of questions, study 
and analysis, search for solutions and defining the final décision and 
which methods of implementation shall employées and their union share, 
and in what manner, the responsibilities of decision-making with man-
agement. Current arrangements must be viewed essentially as transition-
al accommodations in the unending search for viable, more satisfying 
and productive plans. 
MANAGEMENT INITIATIVES: ORGANISATIONS RELATIONS AND» WORK 
SATISFACTION. 
Managements' Personnel Policies 
Starting from a position of unchallenged authority, managements 
in the early days of industrialism in the western countries forcefully 
pressed their économie goals, moderating them to act on their phi-
lanthropie dispositions toward employées. In time such autocratie prac-
tices had to give way to a more «humane» spirit. Managements in 
the United States in the twenties moved toward «welfare capitalism» 
and experimented with «employée représentation» plans, to cool inci-
pient and actual industrial unrest and deal with the Americanized 
work force. Thèse initiatives were swept away in the thirties and 
forties. In the United States the force was industrial unionism; in 
northern Europe it was the ascendant Social Démocratie parties and 
the broader acceptance of unions and collective bargaining. 
The post-war era demanded new management styles and philoso-
phies but retained the basic conviction that managements' prérogatives 
in the enterprise would be carefully preserved. In the United States 
first appeared «human relations approaches» to accommodate to and 
counter trade union growth. The prééminent appeal was to the individual 
employée by way of humanized management and supervision. Personal 
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counseling, sensitive supervision, extensive communication and more 
humane treatment were the tools, but not changes in the job itself. The 
objective was to gain employée identification with or even sanction for 
management and enterprise goals, or, at least, acquiescence and accept-
ance. With the décline in the threat of a broader pénétration of unionism 
in the private sector, management leaders in the sixties took up a more 
relaxed and variegated approach including récognition of the pluralisme 
nature of the enterprise and the différences in expectations among 
groups of employées, generally referred to as « organizational be-
haviour. » Still basically oriented to the closed plant society, it focused 
on cultivating job satisfaction, and higher productivity and stability on 
the discrète job in the immédiate environment and in the peripheral 
relations with other work groups. Accommodations to diverse groups 
did not call for the sharing of spécifie éléments of authority or gains. 
Job redesign, improved supervision, better personal relations and ac-
ceptance, at times, of employée consultation on job rearrangements 
became part of the new pattern. The emphasis is on the job or work 
shop level. 
Job Redesign 
As the issues of the « quality of life » gained great currency at the 
beginning of the seventies, the above developments became part of the 
discussion of labor participation. Excesses of Taylorism and « scientific 
management» had to be connected. Routinized jobs had deprived 
employées of responsibilities and a rôle in job decision-making. Earlier 
proposais were now assembled to create the balance; job rotation, 
altération of job tasks ; job enlargement, both horizontal and vertical, 
a form of rotation to overcome monotony by expanding the range of 
duties ; and finally, job enrichment, the addition of limited responsibilities 
for the organization, planning, testing and final delivery of work to 
endow the employée with a feeling of product création. The effort 
reached few United States employées, estimated to be some three 
thousand. 
The humanization process usually concentrated on a spécifie 
aspect of the individual job rather than the total work environment and 
Personal career. «Human resource accounting» was added to the kit of 
tools in the hope of finding a System for formai évaluation and auditing 
of costs and pay-offs for personnel activities and improved employée 
utilization as well as increased individual employée self-realization, and 
financial advancement. 
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European Job Developments 
Thèse trends find some replication in Western Europe, but the 
more distinctively innovative expériences on the continent stem from 
différent industrial and political environments. Action there could not 
simply be reactive and défensive. Unions are better organized and mil-
itant. Many governments are led by Social Democrats or other allies 
responsive to trade union aspirations. Management leaders are generally 
more determined to prove their sensitivity to employée needs to gain 
their overt good-will and that of the unions. Swedish employers are 
foremost in the organized search of new concepts and paths, not only 
in the matter of personnel and management practice but also in the 
design of plant, process and machinery. 
Managements in Europe more often than in the United States turn 
to unions and/or work councils to support innovations at the job and 
operating level. Scandinavian national trade union centers joined man-
agement associations in sponsoring experiments and advances. Au-
tonomous self-governing démocratie Workgroups, essentially collective 
substitutes for individual job design, symbolize the types of ventures 
favored in thèse areas. Management consultations with unions and work 
councils on innovations occur not only after décisions are made, but 
before the problems are selected and during the course of study and 
analysis and their aid is solicited in the decision-making process. 
In Sweden, the new laws require most of thèse steps. 
In Italy, trade unions grasped the initiative in the field of job and 
career redesign, after they supplanted the works councils in the 
seventies. They integrated union-oriented values into the program 
including the advancement of employée career patterns rather than 
mère personal job fulfillment, employée skill versatility and higher job 
grades. The German trade union movements «work humanizing» pro-
gram embraces not only the employée's immédiate job, stressing group 
work, a minimal hierarchical structure, participation in work décisions, 
information and career developments, but also his total social environ-
ment, stressing that off-the-job tensions and frustrations are inséparable 
from those on the job. 
Scope of Job Redesign 
The latter view raises serious questions concerning past manage-
ment initiatives. More than relief from job monotony created by existing 
technology or job arrangements or designs is required. It is an appro-
priate target for the further «humanization of work» but there are 
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other dimensions. The Tavistock Institute (British) in its writings and 
research efforts projected the enterprise not only as an économie unit 
but also as a « socio-technical system. » In Europe many unions demand 
new forms for bilatéral decision-making through the plant bargaining 
structure or the corporate bodies. The quality of nonoccupational and 
communal life intimately affect and condition job and plant attitudes, 
satisfactions and performance. Humanized organizational behavior 
coupled with bilatéral or multi-lateral decision-making and improvement 
of the off-the-job life constitute the framework for the new drives 
for a higher quality of life. 
EMPLOYEE AND TRADE UNION DRIVES FOR INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 
Goals and General Rights 
For almost two centuries, industrial protest movements gravitated 
to the demands for industrial democracy. Thèse are from time to time 
stated differently and the shibboleths are altered. But each calls for the 
élimination or restriction of the rights of the dominant industrial 
hierarchy and the expansion of employée rights. Sometimes spécifie 
proposais are relatively modest, seniority rules to curb capricious 
management; at other times, they move for major changes, the intro-
duction of collective bargaining. 
In the past history of industrial democracy the emphasis has been 
upon class rights and gênerai principles rather than as in the preceding 
section upon individual jobs or employées. Even the American craft-
union, conservative in its orientation, preoccupied as it is with its 
membership presented its demands for security for a collectivity, the 
whole labor market. After a gênerai principles are enscribed, attention is 
shifted to the individual to ensure that he enjoys the rights and benefits 
assured under thèse principles. The Italian trade union programs for the 
humanization of work were first negotiated with management in the 
form of principles and the applied to the individual or group. The 
movement for industrial democracy has a distinctive orientation: it is 
dedicated to collective principles and not in the first instance to the 
discrète individual. 
Trade Unionism and Collective Bargaining: A Stage of Industrial Democracy 
The realistic search for industrial democracy in western countries 
began with the struggle for union récognition and bilatéral decision-
making (collective bargaining). In North America, the course can be 
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clearly traced. Preambles to the constitutions of several trade unions 
drafted before World War I proclaimed their goal as industrial demo-
cracy. Appeals to workers to organize were made in thèse terms. 
Where unions and collective bargaining were initiated, they foliow-
ed either one of two patterns of relations. Either they created an 
industrial government or a joint labor-management System of decision-
making on matters in the contract or on which they agreed, with the 
former becoming the more pervasive. Unions sought the unfolding 
contract with an ever broadening area of joint concern. The conflict 
on the scope of collective bargaining grew as managements defended 
their «prérogatives.» The National Labor Relations Board and the 
courts interprétations of the law extended this scope of bargaining. 
But this issue in the sixties lost much of its primary in the private 
sector. In fact, under the pressure of récent économie adversity in 
unionized areas, established protective control and practices hâve been 
lost in many areas. Aggressive management eliminated many islands 
of employée self-government. In other instances, unions accepted the 
abridgement and élimination of long established working rules. Move-
ments both toward the abridgement and expansion of the scope of 
bargaining are being reported in the public sector. Teachers are seeking 
to gain veto powers over management décisions or rights to bilatéral 
décision-making. Public managements across the country are introduc-
ing severe controls and eliminating well-established or negotiated em-
ployée practices. Clashes in thèse areas are likely to occupy the center 
of the industrial relations scène in the public sector. Few are the 
cases this country of bilatéral decision-making deliberately serving con-
current^ to enhance employée and institutional goals. 
European Unions Move to Supersede the Works Councils 
European developments hâve been very différent. Unions fought 
for survival well into the thirties. The dictators destroyed many of 
thèse unions. In Northern Europe when they revived, their emphasis 
was on national or industry agreements, rather than the workplace or 
local controls. They sought immédiate security through minimum terms 
of employment and a skeleton of rights by contract and law. Full 
employment and the new progressive attitudes led to improved working 
conditions, and benefits, higher standards of living and the humanization 
of personnel practices. Social législation reinforced and supplemented 
thèse advances. Progress appeared continuous. 
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But union weaknesses in the shops persisted, in part due to the 
divisions within their ranks. Unions, therefore, did not challenge or 
take over the works council but rather sought to benefit from their 
légal powers and the protection they provided and the channels they 
afforded for limited redress. In the third postwar décade under the 
impulses of new employée militancy, expressed in occasional factory 
occupations, work sit-ins, plant take-overs, and unofficial strikes, and 
the popularization of humanistic views, European unions moved anew 
to strengthen their own positions and rights on the job, and within the 
enterprise. 
Trade unions foliowed several alternative courses. Of course many 
concentrated on building their local organizations. In some countries 
they took over direct control of the works councils, even where they 
were créatures of the law. Councils membership had been predominantly 
composed of trade unionists, but union relations with and direction of 
them now became direct and firm. Union représentatives gained légal 
rights for their présence at meetings and to offer counsel to the councils. 
Management influence was minimized, by eliminating management 
chairmen and converting the councils into workers councils. Trade 
union pressures helped expand the councils' authority. French councils 
had self-government rights over social programs ; codetermination rights 
became more extensive, councils could now negotiate over social wel-
fare, personnel policies, individual measures and économie issues, re-
sorting to outside arbitration in case of unresolved différences. Rights 
for consultation grew broader extending to économie and managerial 
issues. Information including intimate financial production and manage-
ment data became accessible with many councils enjoying the right to 
call in outside experts to aid in the analysis. 
Thèse gains must be considered transitional advances to the 
realization of a more ambitious vision. Unions want direct représenta-
tion in the shop either by contract or law. Where the right had been 
gained, their représentatives at times superseded the works councils as 
in Belgium, Italy and the United Kingdom. In other countries they 
desisted from pressing for the full transfers of council authority being 
satisfied to utilize the councils légal priveleges to information, consul-
tation and bilatéral decision-making which management would resist 
granting to the unions themselves. To enhance the effectiveness of this 
représentation trade unions dévote much energy, personnel and funds 
to the training of the councilors. 
Philosophical and legalistic distinctions between the two Systems of 
employée représentation are fading. Dual arrangements persist in 
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France, Germany and Netherlands, often in a compétitive relation to 
one another, particularly where managements as in France seek to limit 
the union's présence and growth of authority in the plant. 
In the Scandinavian countries, works councils are créatures of 
collective agreements. They are intégral parts of the union apparatus. 
Récent législation increased the protection for the stewards and council 
members and the freedom to discharge their duties. In Great Britain 
the shop steward system was ironically strengthened in the early post-
war years by managements to avoid the formai collective bargaining 
machinery. The steward created an independent bargaining system 
superimposed upon the formai one. They were accepted in the latter 
sixties by more democratically-oriented national union leadership, Their 
functions were recognized as vital both to the union and the collective 
bargaining system. 
The industrial democracy movement in Europe in the last décade 
expressed itself substantially in efforts to strengthen the union présence 
and its representational and bargaining functions at the job and plant 
levels often utilizing the formai légal machinery including the works 
councils, spécial employée comittees and recently constituted safety 
enforcement machinery. Their activities, pénétration and influence on 
the job and in the internai plant administration mounted. Further 
developments are still in progress; différences among countries and 
companies within a country are considérable. The direction appears 
clear; future events will help shape the spécifie designs in each country. 
They offer the increased possibility of creating a cohérent single plant 
and job system of bilatéral bargaining, consultation and informational 
analysis. 
Influencing Corporate Policies Impacting on Employée Interests-Co-Determination 
and Employée Corporate Board Directors 
Recognizing that many policies affecting employées are shaped by 
corporate boards of directors, some national union centers fought for 
a présence on them seeking a continuum of the representational process 
from the lowest job to enterprise, industry and national levels. Note-
worthy is the diminished interest among unions in the nationalization 
of industry; they perceived that the shift to public ownership primarily 
leads to a more favorable accommodation with public sector business 
leadership. But this end could be realized even more generally through 
board représentation. Nationalization now looms high in union circles 
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when other objectives are foremost such as the development of energy 
industries, or the reorganization of distressed industries or doctrinaire 
positions. 
Codetermination in its German meaning refers popularly to direct 
or indirect employée représentation on the board of directors usually 
in the supervisory as distinct from management boards. In eight 
European countries where such arrangements are prescribed by law, the 
plans differ from any idealized union model and among themselves. 
Except for France and Germany the législation was enacted in the last 
few years. Ail bear the stamp of employer résistance and political 
conflict. First, unions designate part of the employée délégation only 
in Germany, Luxembourg and two members per board in Sweden. 
Works councils nominate them in Austria and France; the work force 
sélects them in Denmark and Norway, though in the latter the élection 
is for members of a plant assembly which elects the directors who 
include two or up to one-third of the board. In the Netherlands, 
where the board coopts its own additions and receives nominations 
from the council, the latter retains a right to veto. Second, minority 
représentation for employées prevails except in the original 1951 System 
for the German iron and steel industry where there is a parity arrange-
ment. Under the 1976 German law for large scale industry, the parity 
principle is compromised by the inclusion of a senior executive in the 
employée group and the assurance of the désignation of a management 
person as chairman. Third, various restrictions are placed on the sélec-
tion of union officiais tending to establish préférences for actual 
employées and limiting if not excluding the former from the employée 
délégation. Fourth, many conditions including requirements for secrecy, 
assumption of financial responsibilities with other board members for 
board acts, and inhibitions on participation in industrial action, or wage 
negotiations create barriers between board members and the employées. 
The reality is still a distance from the abstract idéal. But already 
changes in law and practices are being instituted to remove some 
harsh deterrents to an effective présence as witness the new Swedish 
law. 
Unionists favoring such représentation hâve met résistance within 
their organizations and a number of European union centers oppose 
such moves, viewing the innovation as compromising the unions and 
preferring certainly in their rhetoric if not in fact a more militant stance. 
Other unionists protest their confidence in not being coopted and the 
value of Systems for promoting employée interests and ultimately the 
ability to affect corporate production and financial policy. In the German 
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expérience, individual illustrations of such influence accumulated parti-
cularly during periods of économie stress lie primarily in the lield of 
personnel action, and are important in view of the traditional authori-
tarian management attitudes and policy and on occasion in the broader 
business field such as investment in foreign production facilities. Union 
centers in other countries view the employée présence as a way to 
familiarize themselves intimately with enterprise opérations and devel-
opments and influence décisions and also improve their powers in col-
lective bargaining. Increased union attention and funds are being 
devoted to the training of such employée directors, with provisions 
increasing for making experts available for consultation. More distant 
is the introduction of new criteria for corporate decision-making em-
phasing social employée oriented tests for many issues includieg new 
investment. Reports from individual employée directors suggest that 
they hâve raised some basic questions in business policy which are 
being explored by some boards. The entire field is quite new and its 
development must be followed carefully before judgments on its opéra-
tions and conséquences may be expressed. Both in Germany and Swe-
den, employers report considerably satisfaction with past expériences. 
Another initiative in this field may be found in countries where 
unions are demanding and obtaining rights to information about or a 
présence in government consultations with business enterprise applying 
for government financial or other aid. The expansion of the économie 
staffs of a number of national union centers came in part from the need 
to offer more active counsel to works council and employée board 
members. A véritable union technical library is developing which will 
permit closer study of comparative views and expérience. 
One restricting factor on the easy growth of thèse Systems is the 
unfriendly attitude of a considérable number of managements and non-
employee members of the boards. The German and Swedish officiai 
literature report cases of deliberate efforts to hamper employée board 
members in the discharge of functions and the deprival of essential 
information. The new Swedish law seeks to correct some of thèse 
conditions but we must learn of its effectiveness. 
Finally, référence must be made to the innovation in the German 
iron-steel industry System of the nomination of a Labor Director by the 
trade union, confirmed by employée directors as one of the three 
management directors. While no such requirement exists in other 
countries, employée directors do promote more favorable sélections for 
the post. 
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Collectively Negotiated Savings Plan for Capital Formation 
The debate in Sweden about a collectively negotiated savings plan 
for capital formation (Meidner Plan) gave international currency to this 
idea. It had its origin in the sixties in Italy. Basically the plan provides 
for portion of the corporate profits to be set aside for a workers fund 
to be administered by trade union designers, thereby assuring them a 
voice in the allocation of funds for new investments. After a period of 
time accumulations in some companies may entitie the fund to a place 
on the company's board of directors. Employée claims are frozen for 
a period of years, after which individuals become eligible for benefits, 
to be used largely for house purchasing or similar goods or retirement 
benefits. The plan seeks equalize the capital claims among the social 
classes. 
A very modest application of this idea exists in Germany which 
results from industry negotiations and opérâtes within the limits of tax 
laws which grant participants spécial benefits and an additional public 
bonus. It hardly approximates the bolder ambitions underlying the 
plans being discussed in other countries. 
Many divisions of the trade union movement oppose thèse plans 
preferring to pursue aggressive collective bargaining. Employers tend to 
counter thèse proposais with recommendations for individual profit 
sharing Systems with direct immédiate benefits to individual employées. 
Labor Participation in Public Policy Decision-Making (Social Contract) and 
Administration 
No understanding of the developments in labor participation in 
decision-making could be adéquate without pointing to the expanding 
rôle of European unions in the area of public policy decision-making 
and its administration. The first extension into this field occured during 
World War I. Trade union officiais occupied ministerial, policy and 
administrative posts. Unions gained a level of récognition never before 
envisaged by the dominant political groups. With the gênerai relapse 
in unionism during the twenties their influence declined but swept 
upwards in the thirties particularly in the Scandinavian countries with 
their Social Démocratie parties and in others as countries drew closer 
to the or engaged in war. Représentatives of the movement were 
brought into cabinets and high government positions. In the fifties 
and in the first half of the sixties, with centrist and conservative gov-
ernments in power, few new advances occurred. 
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A new upsurge in influence on government was évident in the 
third post-war décade. Consultations on économie and social policy 
became widespread. Labor government programs were generally defined 
after discussions with unions and often jointly agreed upon. Unions 
generally became more militant and exercised a radical influence on 
government policy. Probably the most significant expression of this 
new rôle is the Social Contract, reached between the Labor govern-
ments and the trade union organizations on national économie, industrial 
relations and social policy. As members of advisory investigatory 
and administrative public bodies, and of parliaments their influence 
affected national life. 
CONCLUSION 
The demand for industrial democracy has been persistent in 
Western society. The major instrument for this pressure has been the 
trade union movement. Increased éducation and high expectations of 
the work force and a long period of very high employment and new 
attitudes pursuaded management to humanize working conditions and 
give increasing récognition to employées' desires. Besides seeking better 
financial rewards, working conditions, employées also expected less 
degrading social relations on the job. Participation in décision-making 
about work and jobs became a lively demand along with the expectation 
of equal opportunities for social advancement for ail classes. 
Participation in bilatéral décision-making rather than consultation 
or communication appeared to be the clear road for employées and 
their spokesmen, the union. Such participation would enable them to 
use their insights and knowledge to help shape business policy better 
to accord with human and social needs. Managements feared the loss 
of status and power should they yield and also the économie con-
séquences, should non-economic values prevail. Nevertheless the last 
hundred years or more witnessed a steady érosion of management's 
authority. Unions were recognized and then collective bargaining 
rights. The scope of bilatéral decision-making on wages, hours, and 
conditions of employment expanded. Unions thereafter sought the 
means for making their views felt at the company board and national 
levels. Codetermination, employée board directors and collectively 
negotiated savings plans became means to this end. Another was 
political pressure on governments making them more understandiing and 
responsive to employée and union views for redesigning the total 
economy toward more socially oriented goals. The Social Contract 
evolved combining an agreement between government and unions on 
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the principles for terms of employment and économie and industrial 
relations and social policy. 
Spurred on by the new alertness and demands of employées 
for more active participation in decision-making both in the trade 
unions and on the job, more unions particularly in Europe pressed for 
the total humanization of work conditions. The first target was more 
active union pressure on the job. Then came the expansion of the rights 
of the works council which in fact was converted in many places into 
a workers council. Trade unions moved to gain greater rights for 
représentation from the job through the national level. Some introduced 
new dimensions into the rules for job redesign. 
No one country can boast of having achieved thèse goals or 
provided the mechanism for realizing them. The récent advances are 
too new truly to evaluate the gains. Most schemes are compromises 
between union demands and management résistance and other polit-
ical forces. Should the process continue as seems likely, thèse arrange-
ments will undergo vast change. New devices will be recurrently 
fashioned to remain responsive concurrently accomodating both the 
expectations of the employées and the realities of a compétitive éco-
nomie world. This is a wholly new course. No social arrangements 
can be considered rigid and final. That is particularly true of the agencies 
for industrial democracy shaped in the dynamic arena of controversy, 
conflict and compromise. 
La participation des travailleurs: 
un moyen d'atteindre la démocratie industrielle 
La démocratie politique a débarassé le monde des théories de la monar-
chie de droit divin. Le gouvernement représentatif l'a remplacé. Les restric-
tions au droit de vote qui ont marqué les premiers temps de la nouvelle ère 
démocratique ont cédé le pas devant les exigences du suffrage universel dont 
l'objectif fut atteint au cours des années 1920 et qui s'étendit aux moins de 
vingt ans pendant la décennie actuelle. 
En contrepartie, la démocratie industrielle devint à son tour l'objectif 
véritable de divers réformateurs: groupe libéraux et anticapitalistes ainsi que 
partisans du syndicalisme. Le processus de décision au sein de l'entreprise 
devint la cible des partisans de la démocratie industrielle qui cherchent à obte-
nir pour les salariés ces droits suprêmes ou, à tout le moins, une participation 
égale à la direction. Cependant, on a fermement résisté à ce défi. Débats 
et propositions tournoient autour de cette pomme de discorde: le rôle et la 
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forme de la démocratie industrielle dans l'entreprise et, une fois engagé dans 
le processus de sélection des problèmes, l'étude, l'analyse, la recherche 
de solutions, la détermination de la décision finale et les méthodes de mise 
en œuvre dont disposeront les salariés et leur syndicat ainsi que la façon dont 
ils partagent les responsabilités avec la direction. Il ne faut voir dans les 
aménagements actuels que des accommodements transitoires dans la recherche 
interminable de mécanismes viables, satisfaisants et profitables. 
Partis d'une position d'autorité incontestée, les promoteurs de l'indus-
trialisme naissant dans les pays occidentaux ont mis vigoureusement l'accent 
sur la poursuite d'objectifs d'ordre économique qu'ils tempéraient par des 
mesures philanthropiques envers leurs salariés. Avec le temps, de telles pra-
tiques autocratiques ont ouvert la voie à un nouveau type et à de nouvelles 
éthiques de direction qui maintinrent la conviction fondamentale que les préro-
gatives dans l'entreprise seraient conservées. Le processus d'humanisation 
du travail se concentra sur la tâche considérée en soi plutôt que sur l'ambiance 
globale du milieu de travail et la carrière personnelle. La direction des entre-
prises en Europe, beaucoup plus qu'aux États-Unis, se tourna vers les syndi-
cats ou les comités d'entreprise pour appuyer les innovations au niveau de 
la tâche et de son exécution. Un comportement davantage humanisé à l'inté-
rieur de l'entreprise associé à des décisions prises bilatéralement ou multi-
latéralement et l'amélioration de la vie hors du milieu de travail constituent 
l'ossature de nouvelles avenues vers une meilleure qualité de vie. 
Dans l'après-guerre, les syndicats des pays de l'Europe du Nord ont 
d'abord mis l'accent sur les ententes nationales ou sectorielles. Ils ne se sont 
pas opposés de prime abord aux comités d'entreprise non plus qu'ils ne les 
ont pris en main, mais ils ont plutôt cherché à profiter de leurs pouvoirs légis-
latifs, de la protection et des moyens qu'ils offraient d'obtenir un redressement 
limité. Pendant la troisième décennie d'après-guerre, ils ont de nouveau 
manœuvré de manière à renforcer leurs positions et leurs droits au niveau 
des tâches et à l'intérieur de l'entreprise, souvent en se servant du méca-
nisme légal officiel, y compris les comités d'entreprise, des comités spéciaux 
de travailleurs et des organismes de sécurité nouvellement institués. 
Se rendant compte que les politiques relatives aux travailleurs sont 
souvent prises par les bureaux de direction, certaines centrales syndicales ont 
lutté pour y obtenir le droit de présence, cherchant à y être représentées à 
tous les échelons, c'est-à-dire tant au niveau de l'entreprise qu'au plan secto-
riel et national, d'où il convient de noter la diminution de l'intérêt parmi les 
syndicats pour la nationalisation de l'industrie. 
La cogestion, entendue dans le sens allemand, se réfère populairement 
à la représentation directe ou indirecte des salariés dans les bureaux de direc-
tion, ordinairement par l'entremise des comités de surveillance qui sont dis-
tincts des bureaux de direction. Dans huit pays d'Europe, où il existe des 
aménagements exigés par la Loi, les formules de participation différent des 
modèles idéaux des syndicats. 
Les syndicalistes, qui favorisent une telle représentation, ont dû faire 
face à de la résistance à l'intérieur de leurs organisations, et bon nombre 
de centrales européennes s'opposent à une telle orientation, estimant que 
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cette innovation est de nature à compromettre les syndicats en même temps 
qu'elles préfèrent une attitude plus militante, sinon en fait, du moins en parole. 
Les centrales syndicales en certains pays considèrent la présence des salariés 
comme un moyen de se familiariser davantage avec le fonctionnement et le 
développement de l'entreprise, d'influencer les décisions et aussi d'accroître 
leur pouvoir de négociation. 
Autre initiative dans ce domaine: en certains pays, les syndicats deman-
dent et obtiennent le droit à l'information ou d'être présents dans les con-
sultations des entreprises auprès des gouvernements en matière d'aide finan-
cière ou autre. 
Un élément de retard dans l'application de ces systèmes réside dans 
l'attitude peu amicale d'un nombre considérable de directeurs et d'autres 
membres des bureaux de direction qui ne sont pas des salariés. 
Il est impossible de comprendre la participation ouvrière dans l'éla-
boration des décisions sans insister sur le rôle de plus en plus grand que jouent 
les syndicats dans le domaine politique. Un nouvel accroissement de l'influence 
du syndicalisme sur les gouvernements était évident en Europe de l'ouest 
au cours de la troisième décennie d'après-guerre. Les programmes sociaux et 
économiques des gouvernements travaillistes furent définis après discussion 
avec les syndicats et souvent en accord avec eux. Les syndicats sont devenus 
plus militants et ont exercé une influence marquée sur la politique gouver-
nementale. Sans doute l'expression la plus significative de ce nouveau rôle 
consiste-t-elle dans le «contrat social» auquel on en est arrivé entre les gou-
vernements travaillistes et les centrales syndicales touchant l'économie natio-
nale, les relations professionnelles et la politique sociale. 
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